Moral Psychology, Volume 4 Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Published November 11, 2013
Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility.
The contributors—who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga—consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions.
Roy F. Baumeister, Tim Bayne, Gunnar Bj?rnsson, C. Daryl Cameron, Hanah A. Chapman, William A. Cunningham, Patricia S. Churchland, Christopher G. Coutlee, Daniel C. Dennett, Ellen E. Furlong, Michael S. Gazzaniga, Patrick Haggard, Brian Hare, Lasana T. Harris, John-Dylan Haynes, Richard Holton, Scott A. Huettel, Robert Kane, Victoria K. Lee, Neil Levy, Alfred R. Mele, Christian Miller, Erman Misirlisoy, P. Read Montague, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, William T. Newsome, B. Keith Payne, Derk Pereboom, Adina L. Roskies, Laurie R. Santos, Timothy Schroeder, Michael N. Shadlen, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sripada, Christopher L. Suhler, Manuel Vargas, Gideon Yaffe
About the Editor
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics at Duke University and the editor of the previous volumes of Moral Psychology, all published by the MIT Press.
"This is an outstanding collection of work at the intersection between science and traditional approaches to moral responsibility (and free will). The contributors are among the very best people working in these areas. The book is strong evidence for the contention that progress in understanding freedom of the will and moral responsibility is often enhanced when philosophers and scientists work collaboratively. Highly recommended."
—John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
"Clear, logical, and cogent are not often words associated with discussions of free will or morality—yet the chapters in this book are just that. Experts who have done a lot of thinking about these issues raise points that I would guess not many readers will have thought of, and the diverse array of perspectives is explained so well that readers who are not immersed in the science, philosophy, and debates about free will and moral responsibility will learn a lot and keep reading. I certainly did—and then immediately started telling colleagues to read this book."
—Kathleen Vohs, Editor of Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work
"With this volume, Sinnott-Armstrong has created a much needed point of entry into the free will debate. Drawing heavily on the neuroscience of choice, he deftly balances a dizzying array of perspectives built in large part on empirical facts. You experience free will emerging as an exciting yet profoundly complicated scientific challenge."
—Scott Grafton, University of California, Santa Barbara